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Abstract
The present work proposes a novel probabilistic method to reconstruct a hand
shape image from its template. We analyse the degree of similarity between the
reconstructed images and the original samples in order to determine whether the
synthetic hands are able to deceive hand recognition systems. This analysis is
made through the estimation of the success chances of an attack carried out with
the synthetic samples against an independent system. The experimental results
show that there is a high chance of breaking a hand recognition system using this
approach. Furthermore, since it is a probabilistic method, several synthetic images
can be generated from each original sample, which increases the success chances
of the attack.
Keywords: Biometric systems, Hand recognition, Hand reconstruction, Security,
Vulnerabilities
1. Introduction
Biometrics are nowadays being introduced into many applications as an alter-
native to traditional security mechanisms [38, 75]. The main advantage of bio-
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metric systems is that you no longer need to carry a key or remember a PIN code:
you are your own key.
One of the most popular biometric traits deployed by these systems is the
hand [61, 77]. In the last 30 years, hand recognition devices have been installed in
airports, nuclear plants or hotels [49, 79]. These systems offer a reliable [30, 41,
73], low-cost (acquisition can be made by means of commercial low-resolution
scanners or cameras) and user-friendly [32, 42] solution for a wide range of access
control applications.
However, as any other security device, these systems are also vulnerable to
external attacks that may compromise their security [62]. Therefore, it is of the
utmost importance to understand and analyse these eventual threats in order to
increase the security offered by biometric systems.
One of the areas that is more directly related to the vulnerabilities evaluation
of biometric systems and that presents a high potential impact in their security, is
the reconstruction of a biometric trait starting from the original user template, or
inverse biometrics. If such an inverse engineering process is possible, an eventual
attacker that manages to obtain a template belonging to a certain user (e.g. the
iriscode or minutiae template) would be able to reconstruct the original biometric
sample and could use it to illegally access the system.
In this context, the ultimate question is: are we able to generate synthetic
images whose templates are similar enough to those of the original user? That
would mean that given just a template, we are able to reconstruct an image with
which we can deceive a recognition system or even steal someone’s identity.
In the past, it has been a common belief that templates do not comprise enough
information in order to reconstruct the original sample from them [35]. However,
recent studies have arisen several concerns regarding the soundness of this widely
spread belief for traits such as the fingerprint [12], the iris [67] or the face [26].
In this work, we address for the first time these questions and concerns for the
hand trait. For this purpose, we present a novel probabilistic approach based on
the Uphill Simplex algorithm and a hand-shape generator for the reconstruction
of hand shape images from their templates. Three main objectives are pursued in
the present work:
 Analyse the feasibility of such a reverse engineering process for the hand
geometry trait.
 Study whether the reconstructed images obtained with the proposed method
are able to deceive state-of-the-art hand recognition systems. This will also
serve as validation for the new reconstruction technique.
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 Determine if it is possible to generate not just one, but several different
synthetic images which yield templates very similar to the genuine one.
In this new scenario, the results presented in this contribution show the neces-
sity to include in hand-shape applications efficient countermeasures to repel the
studied attacks [19, 21].
In order to follow a fully reproducible experimental protocol which permits the
comparison of the results with future studies, experiments are carried out on three
publicly available databases. Furthermore, the hand recognition systems used for
development and testing are well known and state-of-the-art systems which may
be easily obtained by any interested party.
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, a selection of the
most important related works may be found in Sect. 2. Hand recognition is briefly
summarized in Sect. 3. The novel probabilistic hand reconstruction algorithm is
presented in Sect. 4. Then, the experimental protocol together with the databases
and hand recognition systems used are described in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6 the devel-
opment and validation results, as well as a quality assessment of the real and the
synthetic samples, are presented. Conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 7.
2. Related Works
A growing interest has arisen in the biometric community over the last decade
for the generation of synthetic biometric traits such as voice [18], fingerprints [11],
iris [80], handwriting [47], face [57] or signature [58].
One of the first research lines in this field was the generation of the so-called
duplicated samples. In these methods the generation algorithm starts from one or
more real samples of a given person and, through different transformations, pro-
duces different synthetic (or duplicated) samples corresponding to the same sub-
ject. This type of algorithms is useful to increase the amount of already acquired
biometric data which can be helpful, for instance, to synthetically augment the
size of the enrolment set of data in identification and verification systems, a crit-
ical parameter for instance in signature biometrics [22]. This approach has been
applied to signature [52, 55], handwriting [51, 69] or face synthesis [57, 68, 70].
Based on those initial works, researchers have also focused their efforts on
a second and more complex problem: the generation of fully synthetic biometric
individuals. In this case, some kind of a priori knowledge about a certain biometric
trait (e.g., minutiae distribution, iris structure, signature length, etc.) is used to
create a model that characterizes that biometric trait for a population of subjects.
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New synthetic individuals can then be generated sampling the constructed model.
In a subsequent stage of the algorithm, multiple samples of the synthetic users can
be generated by any of the procedures for creating duplicated samples. Different
model-based algorithms have been presented in the literature to generate synthetic
individuals for biometric traits such as iris [15, 64, 80], fingerprint [11], or speech
[40, 56].
All the previous works have been mainly focused on the generation of new
synthetic data, intended in general to overcome the limitation of assembling large
biometric databases for performance assessment purposes. However, none of
these very valuable efforts addresses directly the main objective raised in the
present work referred to as inverse biometrics, that is, the reconstruction of a syn-
thetic biometric sample from a genuine template and the evaluation of the ensuing
security implications.
One of the first works that addressed the problem posed by inverse biometrics
was carried out by Hill [31]. This work, focused on fingerprint recognition, proves
that the information stored in the minutiae template allows the reconstruction of
images similar to the original fingerprint. After him, other researches have gen-
erated fingerprint images [12, 59] or gummy fingers [25] given only the minutiae
template. However, not only fingerprints have been successfully reconstructed: in
[1, 2, 26] face images are recovered from their templates, and in [67] iris images
are generated starting from the iriscodes.
In our particular case study, hand shape recognition, to our knowledge, only
our previous work [28] addresses the inverse biometrics problem, proposing the
first reconstruction approach to recover hand geometry samples from their tem-
plates. In that work, only the theoretical framework was proposed and some pre-
liminary experiments were carried out. In the present contribution we significantly
extend that initial work with: i) a more thorough and comprehensive description
of the algorithm, ii) a very much improved experimental protocol with the use
of different databases and recognition systems, iii) new and more reliable ex-
perimental findings, iv) an exhaustive analysis of the results, and v) a quality
assessment of the synthetic hand shape images generated.
3. Summary of Hand Recognition
In this section the main aspects of the hand recognition problem directly re-
lated to the present study are briefly summarized. For a more comprehensive
review of hand-shape recognition the reader is referred to specific works on the
topic [16, 17, 39, 41, 45, 61, 76, 79].
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In order to perform recognition of individuals through their hands, different
features may be used, namely: hand geometry [61], shape [41], the palm texture
[77], or fusions of those features [43, 44]. Only the first two sets are studied in the
present work:
 Hand geometry: since the length and width of the fingers are relatively
simple to extract and present a significative discriminative power, they are
suited for verification purposes. Some examples can be found in [8, 37, 46,
71].
 Hand shape: hand shapes contain very rich information which exhibits a
big variation between individuals. Therefore, many hand-based recognition
systems make their decisions relying on this kind of information [7, 13,
23, 36, 41, 73]. In the present work, these systems will be referred to as
appearance-based systems.
 Silhouette alignment: the coordinates of the silhouette of the hand con-
tains discriminative information which can be used for person recognition
by aligning the silhouettes. Some examples are presented in [16, 17, 19, 37].
Another problem related to hand verification is the acquisition device. Wong
et al. discuss in [72] the advantages and disadvantages of the two main possible
scenarios:
 Camera: its main advantages are its acquisition speed and the use of a
contactless setup, so that no plastic deformation is produced in the hand
shape and its features.
 Scanner: scanners offer a higher image resolution and a more comfortable
acquisition scenario to the user, as well as an homogeneous background that
makes the hand segmentation easier. However, in this case some amount of
deformation is introduced as a consequence of the contact between the hand
and the scanner surface, which increases the intra-user variability.
As it is described in Sect. 5, databases acquired both with a camera and a
scanner are used in the experiments. Furthermore, the experimental protocol in-
cludes four completely different systems, two based on geometric features, one
on the global hand shape appearance, and a last one on the hand silhouette. The
objective of this experimental setup is to perform a study as general as possible
regarding the state-of-the-art on hand recognition systems and databases.
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Figure 1: General structure of the image reconstruction method proposed in this work.
4. The Reconstruction Method
Problem Statement. Consider the problem of finding a real-valued matrix
(in our case representing a hand geometry image) IR which, compared to an
unknown template T (related to a specific client), produces a similarity score
bigger than a certain threshold , according to some unknown function V , i.e.:
s = V(IR;T) > . The mapping function V is internally divided into two
sub-functions, also unknown: F(IR) = TR extracts the features from the in-
put image IR and obtains the corresponding template TR, and J (TR;T) = s
computes the similarity score between TR and the target template T. That is:
V(IR;T) = J (F(IR);T) = J (TR;T) = s.
Assumptions. Let us assume that we have access to the evaluation of the
function V(IR;T) for several trials of IR.
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved combining the hill-
climbing approach based on the Uphill Simplex algorithm first presented in [27]
to optimize the input of a generator of hand shape images, according to the general
diagram presented in Fig. 1.
Hand-shape generator. The generator used to obtain the matrices IR (hand
shape images) that will be compared with the target, T, is based on the Active
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Figure 2: General diagram of the hand shape generator used in the hand shape reconstruction
method, with a zoom on the hand landmarks and contour.
Shape Model approach [13, 14]. A general diagram of the generator is shown in
Fig. 2. The first step is to train the ASM model using the aligned hand contours
from the development set GPDS2 DB, as will be presented in Sect. 6.1. The
process of aligning the contours can be divided in four stages: i) for each hand
image, we automatically locate 14 landmarks (see crosses in Fig. 2) using the
methodology proposed in [19]; ii) the contours are aligned by placing the hand
geometric center as the coordinate origin, and rotating the hand contour by an
angle equal to the slope of the line between the 1st and 3rd finger-web: this allows
to reduce the effects of translation and rotation; iii) the envelope line between
landmarks is sampled with a number of points equal to average envelope length
7
 Score (s) 
SIMPLEX REFLECTION ( ) 
EXPANSION (!) 
CONTRACTION (") 
NEW SIMPLEX 
CENTROID 
Switch 
 
Vector (y) 
yl 
Target (T) Target (T) 
b 
b 
a 
Figure 3: General diagram of the Uphill Simplex algorithm used in the hand shape reconstruction
method.
in GPDS2 DB divided by five; iv) finally, the hand contour is represented as a
2n element vector composed by the coordinates (x and y) of n = 630 selected
contour points.
As we enforce a common number of points between landmarks, the alignment
in the positioning of landmarks inside the sampled vector is ensured for all the
contours.
Let x be the hand mean contour obtained as x = 1
100
P100
i=1 xi, being xi 2
R2n1 the vector that represents the contour of the i-th GPDS2 DB user. Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) is applied to determine the k main directions of vari-
ation of the development set. A reconstructed hand-contour can be then generated
as:
IcR = x+ Py
where P 2 R2nk is the projection matrix, whose columns are the eigenvectors of
the covariance matrix, and y = [y0; : : : ; yk 1] is the vector of parameters defining
the hand-shape contour, which will be optimized by the Uphill Simplex. IcR is the
contour vector of the generated hand. The reconstructed binary hand-shape, IR, is
obtained ensuring the continuity of the contour points by lineal interpolation and
applying a flood-fill operation on background pixels of the binary contour image
generated with IcR.
Uphill Simplex. Development experiments are carried out on the GPDS2 DB
in Sect. 6.1 to determine the four initialization parameters of the hand shape gen-
erator [13, 14] and the Uphill Simplex.
In order to optimize the input of the hand shape generator, as depicted in Fig. 1,
the proposed reconstruction approach uses the Uphill Simplex algorithm [27]. Let
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us consider a simplex, that is, a polygon defined by k + 1 points yi in the k-
dimensional space, obtained from randomly sampling a statistical model G (com-
puted from a development pool of users). Each of these yi k-dimensional points
(with i = 1; : : : ; k + 1) is transformed into a hand shape image IR using the hand
shape generator (see Fig. 2). We iteratively form new simplices by reflecting one
point, yl, in the hyperplane of the remaining points, in order to increase at each
iteration the value of the mapping function V(IR;T). The point to be reflected
will always be the one with the lowest score s, since it is, in principle, the one
furthest from our objective (see Fig. 3). The algorithm stops when one of the IRi
images produces a score higher than the threshold .
In particular, the different steps followed by the reconstruction algorithm are:
1. Compute empirically the statistical model G from a development pool of
users.
2. Take randomly k + 1 samples (yi) defining the initial simplex from the
statistical model G and generate the corresponding matrices IRi, with i =
1; : : : ; k + 1, using the hand shape generator (see Fig. 2).
3. Compute the similarity scores V(T; IRi) = si.
4. Compute the centroid y of the simplex as the average of yi.
5. Reflect the point yl according to the next steps, where the indices l and h
are defined as (see Fig. 3):
h = argmax
i
(si) l = argmin
i
(si)
5.a. Reflection: Given a constant  > 0, the reflection coefficient, we
compute:
ya = (1 + )y   yl:
Thus, ya is on the line between yl and y being  the ratio between the
distances [yay] and [yly].
Generate IRa and compute sa = V(T; IRa).
If sl < sa < sh we replace yl by ya. Otherwise, we go to step 5b.
5.b. Expansion or contraction.
5.b.1 Expansion: If sa > sh (i.e., we have a new maximum) we expand
ya to yb as follows:
yb = ya + (1  )y;
where  > 1 is another constant called expansion coefficient,
which represents the ratio between the distances [yby] and [yay].
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Generate IRb and compute sb = V(T; IRb).
If sb > sh, we replace yl by yb. Otherwise, we have a failed
expansion and replace yl by ya.
5.b.2 Contraction: If we have reached this step, then sa  sl (i.e.
replacing yl by ya would leave sa as the new minimum). After-
wards we compute
yb = yl + (1  )y;
where 0 <  < 1 is the contraction coefficient, defined as the
ratio between the distances [yby] and [yly].
Generate IRb and compute sb = V(T; IRb).
If sb > max(sl; sa), then we replace yl by yb; otherwise, the
contracted point is worse than yl, and for such a failed contraction
we replace all the yi’s by (yi + yh)=2.
6. With the new yl value, update the simplex and return to step 4.
Rationale behind the algorithm.. As stated in [48], when we move from the
worst vertex (yl) towards any of the other vertices, the function value s increases.
Hence, assuming a continuous fitness function V with a relatively smooth surface
following a general commanding gradient (which is the usual case for unencrypted
biometric systems), it is feasible that a point ya lying on the line [yyl] on the
opposite side of yl with respect to the hyperplane defined by the other k points
(i.e., outside the simplex) achieves higher values of V . If the function value sa
is higher than the value of all vertices, then we have most likely moved in the
correct direction, and the maximum may lie ahead. This is the case in step 5.b.1,
when the point is further expanded in the same direction. On the other hand, if the
new point ya results in a new minimum (i.e., its function value sa is lower than in
any other vertex), the maximum is probably close to yl. Therefore, the simplex is
contracted by finding a new point in the [yly] line inside rather than outside the
simplex, as in case 5.b.2. If this new point achieves no improvement over yl, the
only remaining option is contracting the whole simplex: the maximum probably
lies inside the simplex. All these scenarios are depicted in Fig. 3 for clarity in only
two dimensions, where the simplex is a triangle.
Stopping criteria. The hill climbing algorithm stops when sh   (i.e., the
image has been successfully reconstructed) or when the maximum number of it-
erations is reached (i.e., the reconstruction has failed).
Important notices. It has to be emphasized that the Uphill Simplex is not
used to optimize the templates T deployed by the development recognition sys-
tem, but the vectors y needed by the hand shape generator (which do not coincide
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with T). This way, the proposed approach is general as it can be used to recon-
struct the hand shape images independently of the template T (e.g., size, format,
information stored, ...) used by the system.
It should also be noted that, due to the probabilistic nature of the algorithm
initialization (i.e., step 2: random sampling of the statistical modelG), the method
produces different solutions at each execution. This permits the reconstruction of
more than one hand image (IR) with very similar templates (TR) to the target (T).
Furthermore, the algorithm does not require any information about:
 The mapping function F between the hand shape images (IR) and their
corresponding templates (TR).
 The matching function J .
 The function V , only needing access to its outcome for given inputs.
Lastly, it should be beard in mind that, as will be explained in Sect. 6, a de-
velopment pool of users is necessary to determine the initialization parameters of
the hand shape generator and the Uphill Simplex, namely: i) the dimensionality
(k) of the vector y, ii) the PCA matrix P , iii) the mean x of the development set
of hand shape images, and iv) the statistical model G for the Uphill Simplex.
5. Experimental Protocol and Databases
As it is shown in Fig. 4, the experimental protocol is divided into a develop-
ment and a validation stage:
 Development. The purpose of this stage is twofold: on the one hand, com-
plete the training of the hand synthesizer and fix the initialization parameters
(k, P , G and x) of the reconstruction algorithm; on the other hand, once the
training phase has been completed, generate the synthetically reconstructed
datasets (S-GPDS and S-UST) that will be used in the validation stage.
 Validation. The objective of this stage is to validate the proposed recon-
struction scheme and to estimate its performance. For this purpose, the
synthetically reconstructed samples generated in the development stage are
presented to three different hand recognition systems to determine if they
are positively matched to the genuine original images (which would mean
the reconstruction approach is successful).
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Figure 4: Diagram of the experimental protocol followed in the present work. Both the real and
the synthetic databases, as well as the systems used, are highlighted with a darker shade.
For the development and validation stages three different databases and four
different hand recognition systems (described respectively in Sects. 5.1 and 5.2)
have been used in order to avoid biased results. All of them are either publicly
available or well described in the literature so that the experiments are fully re-
producible and the results here presented may be compared with future similar
works.
5.1. Databases
The images used to train the hand generator and to compute the initialization
parameters are taken from the GPDS2 database [50], while the real hand shape
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Figure 5: Typical samples of the real databases used in the development (GPDS2 DB) and valida-
tion (GPDS DB and UST DB) steps of the experimental protocol.
samples to be reconstructed are taken from the GPDS [20] and the UST [63]
databases. It is important to notice that the images used to train the generator
are independent and belong to completely different users than those being recon-
structed. That way, the results obtained with the reconstruction method are not
optimistically biased:
 Development: GPDS2 DB. In order to train the hand-shape generator and
initialize the Uphill Simplex (i.e., compute the initialization parameters G,
P , k, x), the GPDS2 DB [50] is used. This database comprises one sample
of the right hand of 100 users, captured with a 60 dpi commercial scanner in
one session. It should be noted that with such resolution (60 dpi) the hand
shape is not very accurately defined, making it harder for the generator to
learn the hand characteristics and compute high quality reconstructions.
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Once the hand shape generator has been trained, it is combined with the Up-
hill Simplex algorithm as described in Sect. 4 to reconstruct the hand images from
the real databases: GPDS DB and UST DB. As shown in Fig. 4, in the valida-
tion step each of the two synthetically reconstructed datasets (named S-GPDS DB
and S-UST DB respectively) is used to evaluate the performance of the proposed
reconstruction method: we try to access the three different recognition systems
used for validation presenting a synthetic sample from the reconstructed database
instead of a real image. The system will perform the comparison with the user
model comprising only real images and output its decision: if access is granted
it means that the synthetic reconstruction was positively matched to the genuine
sample and that our goal of reverse engineering hand shape images from their
templates was achieved. Therefore, the datasets used for validation are:
 Validation: GPDS DB1. The first set of images reconstructed using the pro-
posed approach come from the GPDS dataset, which comprises 144 users
with 10 images per user (only right hand of each subject). All of them were
acquired in one session with a commercial digital scanner of 150 dpi at the
University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria [20], placing the right hand flat
on the glass platen.
 Validation: UST DB. The second database used in the validation experi-
ments comprises 564 users (right and left hands belonging to the same per-
son are regarded as different users) with 10 images per user. Images were
captured using a CCD camera (1280 960 pixels) by the Hong Kong Uni-
versity of Science and Technology [63]. The final version of this database
has not been published yet and includes a small number of duplicates.
 Validation: S-GPDS DB. It comprises three synthetic reconstructed sam-
ples of each of the original 144 users in the GPDS DB. All the reconstruc-
tions are generated from the same randomly selected original sample as will
be explained in Sect. 6.1.
 Validation: S-UST DB. It comprises three synthetic reconstructed samples
of each of the original 564 users in the UST DB. As in the previous case, all
the reconstructions are generated from the same randomly selected original
sample.
1Publicly available at http://www.gpds.ulpgc.es/download/index.htm
14
It is important to notice that the capturing devices used in the acquisition of
the two real databases to be reconstructed are completely different: the GPDS
DB was captured using a digital scanner and the UST DB using a CCD camera.
Thus, while hands are placed on a glass platen in the first case, leading to a certain
distortion on the acquired image, hands belonging to the UST DB are captured
using a contactless protocol so that no distortion is produced. This way we will
be able to determine to what extent the proposed reconstruction approach is able
to generate samples acquired under totally different conditions.
We can observe the plastic distortion in the two databases captured with a
scanner in Fig. 5: the GPDS2 DB (development stage) and the GPDS DB (vali-
dation stage). The difference in terms of resolution between the scanners used in
both cases is also noticeable, especially in the distorted areas. On the other hand,
the effect of different illumination conditions during the acquisition of the images
of the UST DB (validation step) can be also observed in the last row of Fig. 5.
5.2. Hand Recognition Systems
Four different hand based recognition systems are used in the experiments, as
can be seen in Fig. 4. In the development step, a geometry-based system is used
to reconstruct the hand images, while in the validation step three systems based in
different sets of features (namely, geometry-, appearance- and silhouette-related)
are used to test whether the images obtained in the previous stage are positively
matched to real samples of the genuine user by completely independent systems.
 Development: geometry-based system [19]. Geometric features of the
hands (48 widths and 4 lengths from the little, ring, middle and index fin-
gers) are obtained by measuring the widths and lengths of each finger. For
verification, a least squares support vector machine (LS-SVM) is used to
model each hand [65]. This system does not take into account any fea-
tures obtained from the thumb as, due to their high variability, it has been
demonstrated that they do not improve the performance of the geometry-
based hand recognition systems [16].
 Validation. In order to prove the efficiency of the proposed approach, three
different systems, based on distinct and independent features, are used for
validation.
– Geometry-based system [9]. Taking measures of the four fingers (ex-
cluding the thumb) lengths and widths, this system computes a dissim-
ilarity measure, the Manhattan distance, between hand feature vectors.
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– Appearance-based system [74]. This system makes its decisions
based on the whole hand shape, including the thumb, considering in-
dependent component features (ICA2) and images normalized after
pose correction.
– Silhouette-based system [19]. The method employed on this paper is
based on direct silhouette alignment of 50 equal spaced samples of the
finger contour of the hands excluding the thumb. The matching score
is computed estimating the modified Hausdorff distance between the
silhouettes of the fingers of two hands after an alignment that includes
translation and rotation with no shape deformation.
It should be noted that according to Jain et al. [37], geometric features are
somewhat correlated. Therefore, this kind of features are in some cases not suf-
ficiently discriminative and for more demanding applications in terms of perfor-
mance other additional independent features such as hand global shape or appear-
ance should be considered. Since in the experiments described in the present work
a geometry-based system is used at the development stage and an appearance-
based system, among others, using independent and uncorrelated features, in the
validation step, the results obtained are not positively biased.
6. Results
As it was already described in Sect. 5, experiments are carried out in two
steps. First of all, in the development step, two completely different databases
(GPDS DB and UST DB), acquired with different devices and conditions, are
reconstructed using a geometry-based hand recognition system, thus leading to
the generation of two synthetic databases (S-GPDS DB and S-UST DB). After-
wards, using three different systems, the validation experiments are performed:
the synthetic images obtained in the development step are presented to each of the
validation systems to determine if they are accepted as original or not.
The experimental framework has been designed not only to avoid biased re-
sults, but also to estimate the degree of compliance of the proposed reconstruction
approach with the main objectives set in this work: i) determine the feasibility
of recovering a hand shape image from its template, ii) evaluate to what extent
the hand reconstructed images are able to compromise the security of hand recog-
nition systems, and iii) determine if it is possible to generate different synthetic
samples from one given template.
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Finally, a quality assessment study has been carried out. All the images of
both the real and the synthetic databases are examined in order to determine if
they are valid or non-valid hand images. Then the results of the real and the syn-
thetic databases are compared, in order to determine the feasibility of developing
a countermeasure against the detected vulnerability based on the quality of the
presented images.
6.1. Development Experiments: Geometry-Based System
Exhaustive development experiments were carried out on the GPDS2 DB to
determine the four initialization parameters of the hand shape generator [13, 14],
namely: i) the dimensionality (k) of the vector y, which was finally set to k = 50
dimensions, thus taking into account 99.9% of the variance in the trained model;
ii) the PCA matrix P ; iii) the statistical model G, which was defined as a uni-
form distribution within the limits [ 3pj; 3pj], being j the eigenvalue cor-
responding to the j-th eigenvector of matrix P (with j = 1; : : : ; k); and iv) the
mean x of the development set of hand shape images.
In [27], an exhaustive set of experiments was carried out in order to select
the best possible values for the parameters of the Uphill Simplex (,  and ).
Since the goal of the present work is not finding the optimal parameter set, but
proving the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed reconstruction method as
well as providing an estimation of the hand recognition systems vulnerabilities to
the reconstruction scheme, no further experiments were carried out to determine
new values for these parameters. Furthermore, by using the same feature values,
we are also testing the robustness of the Uphill Simplex algorithm against different
biometric traits.
In our previous work [27], we performed three successive steps fixing in each
of them two of the parameters and sweeping the other in a given range. According
to the original Downhill Simplex algorithm [53], the best values for the parameters
are  = 1,  = 2 and  = 0:5. Thus, the selected ranges were centred on those
values, taking always into account the constraints explained in Sect. 4, namely:
 > 0,  > 1 and 0 <  < 1. Finally, the parameters values (that will be used in
the experiments in the present research work) were set to [; ; ] = [1:1; 1:1; 0:8].
In order to determine the positive matching threshold  at which a hand shape
sample is considered to have been successfully reconstructed, the geometry-based
recognition system performance was evaluated on the GPDS DB. Each of the
100 users comprised in the database was modelled with four samples randomly
selected from the ten samples available, and the matching process was repeated ten
times training the user models with four different samples (random selection) each
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GPDS DB UST DB
Rec. Method 100% (109) 100% (215)
Brute Force 52% (15,746) 31% (17,562)
Table 1: Reconstruction rate and average number of comparisons needed to reconstruct a hand
(in brackets) for the two databases reconstructed in the experiments (GPDS DB and UST DB).
Results are given for the reconstruction method proposed in the present article and for an eventual
brute force reconstruction (as baseline).
time. In each of the ten iterations of this process, genuine scores were computed
matching the remaining six samples with the user model (i.e., 144610 = 8; 640
genuine scores), while impostor scores were generated comparing these same six
samples of each user to the remaining users’ models (i.e., 144 143 6 10 =
1; 235; 520 impostor scores). The threshold  was finally fixed at the operating
point corresponding to FAR = 0.01%, since the probability of having an impostor
score at that point is very low: only one impostor in 10,000 would access the
system. Thus, two hand shape images producing a similarity score greater than 
may be considered to belong to the same user.
After the initialization parameters were fixed, we reconstructed the hand shapes
contained in the two real validation databases: GPDS DB and UST DB. Each
user was modelled in the development system with just one randomly selected
hand image, and three synthetic samples were generated using the reconstruc-
tion method proposed. Those synthetic samples constitute the synthetic validation
databases: S-GPDS DB and S-UST DB.
For completeness and also as baseline result with which to compare the perfor-
mance of our reconstruction method, a brute force reconstruction approach (i.e.,
an exhaustive search through a very large number of hand shape images) was also
carried out. For this purpose, 20,000 synthetic hand shapes were randomly gener-
ated with the hand generator (IRm withm = 1; : : : ; 20; 000). As the development
system is working at an operating point where, on average, one real hand image in
10,000 would produce a false positive, it seems that 20,000 may be a reasonable
amount of synthetic samples to find one that is assigned to a given real identity.
Therefore, those images were matched to the users of each database (GPDS DB
and UST DB) until one of the synthetic samples produced a score greater than .
The number of comparisons needed by the brute force strategy to reconstruct a
given hand isM , being IRM the first image that produced the winning score.
The results of both reconstruction approaches (the one proposed in the present
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Figure 6: Examples of the evolution of the score and the synthetic hand shapes through the it-
erations of the proposed algorithm for a successfully reconstructed hand shape of the GPDS DB
(left) and of the UST DB (right). The horizontal dashed line represents the objective threshold ()
where a sample is considered to have been successfully reconstructed.
article and the brute force method) are shown in Table 1, in terms of the recon-
struction rate (i.e., percentage of successfully reconstructed hands) and the aver-
age number of comparisons necessary to reconstruct a hand image. We can ob-
serve that only around 40% of the hand shapes were recovered by the brute force
scheme, while all of them were successfully reconstructed using the method pro-
posed in the present work. Furthermore, the Uphill Simplex-based method is over
100 times faster than the brute force strategy. Therefore, not only the hand shapes
are reconstructed with a considerably lower number of comparisons by the Uphill
Simplex-based approach, but it also guarantees success in the reconstruction, in
contrast to the brute force scheme.
Finally, in Fig. 6 the evolution of the hand shapes (IR) through the iterative
reconstruction process for one user of each validation database is depicted. The
score evolution is also shown, where the horizontal dashed line represents the ob-
jective threshold (). Starting from a random hand (iteration A), it can be seen
that the successive synthetically generated samples evolve towards the original
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user hand (iterations B-E), until the score given by the development recognition
system is higher than : the hand image has been successfully reconstructed (iter-
ation F).
6.2. Validation Experiments
As explained in Sect. 5, the reconstructed images (S-GPDS DB and S-UST
DB) are used to try to access (i.e., attack) the validation systems. Since several
systems are used in this validation step, and the appearance- and silhouette-based
systems work on independent features with respect to the ones used by the devel-
opment system (geometry-based), the results obtained in this validation stage for
each database permit to evaluate in an objective way the ability of the proposed
reconstruction approach to recover the hand-shape images from their templates.
The performance of the attacks is measured in terms of its Success Rate (SR),
which is defined as the expected probability of bypassing the attacked system. It is
computed as the ratio SR = AB=AT , where AB is the number of broken accounts
and AT is the total number of attacked accounts. The SR thus gives an estimation
of how dangerous the attack is: the higher the SR, the bigger the threat. The key
factor to compute the SR is to define what constitutes an attack and when it is
considered to be successful. In the experiments, three representative attacks will
be considered in order to estimate the performance of the proposed reconstruction
method:
1. Attack 1: 1 reconstruction vs 1 real. In this case the attack is carried out on
a 1 on 1 basis. That is, one reconstructed image is matched against one real
image and, if the resulting score exceeds the fixed matching threshold, the
attack has been successful. Two possible scenarios may be distinguished in
this case depending on the real image being attacked:
1.a. The real image being attacked is the original sample from which the
synthetic images were reconstructed. In this scenario the total number
of attacks performed which will be used to compute SR1a is AT1a =
144  3 = 432 for the GPDS DB and AT1a = 564  3 = 1; 692 for
the UST DB.
1.b. The real image being attacked is one of the other nine samples of the
same user present in the corresponding validation DB. For this exper-
iment the total number of attacks performed which will be used to
compute AT1b is AT1b = 144 3 9 = 3; 888 for the GPDS DB and
AT1b = 564 3 9 = 15; 228 for the UST DB.
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2. Attack 2: 3 reconstructions vs 1 real. In this case all three reconstructions
are matched against the real sample. The attack is successful if at least one
of the synthetic images is able to access the system. This represents the
most likely attack scenario analysed in other related vulnerability studies
[12]: the template of the legitimate user is compromised and the intruder
makes different reconstructions of the hand shape to try to break the system.
The attacker will gain access if any of the reconstructions obtains a positive
score. The same two scenarios as in attack 1 can be considered here, being
the total number of attacks carried out in each of them AT2a = 144 for the
GPDS DB and AT2a = 564 for the UST DB; AT2b = 144  9 = 1; 296 for
the GPDS DB and AT2b = 564 9 = 5; 076 for the UST DB. The resulting
success rates will be noted as SR2a and SR2b, respectively.
3. Attack 3: 3 reconstructions vs model (4 real). It is a common practice
in many biometric recognition systems to match the test sample against
a model trained with several stored templates. To emulate this scenario
each reconstructed hand shape image is matched to the user model compris-
ing four samples (randomly selected) of the real user in the corresponding
database. The attack is successful if the final score returned by the system
of any of the three reconstructions is higher than the given operating thresh-
old. Thus, in this case, the total number of attacks performed in order to
compute SR3 is AT3 = 144 for the GPDS DB and AT3 = 564 for the UST
DB.
In general, the success chances of an attack are highly dependent on the False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) of the system. Thus, the vulnerability of the validation
systems to the attacks with the reconstructed images is evaluated at three oper-
ating points corresponding to: FAR = 0.1%, FAR = 0.05%, and FAR = 0.01%,
which, according to [4], correspond to a low, medium and high security appli-
cation, respectively. For completeness, the system is also tested at a very high
security operating point corresponding to FAR 0.01%.
Depending on the experiment at hand, these operating points are estimated (on
the GPDS DB or the UST DB), considering user models computed with either one
hand image (for attacks 1 and 2) or four hand images (attack 3) for each of the
validation systems tested.
Several observations can be made from the results of the validation experi-
ments shown in Tables 2 to 7:
 The high performance of the reconstruction algorithm is confirmed. As ex-
pected, the performance of the synthetic images is higher when a system
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FAR
GPDS DB - Geometry-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 90.26 87.52 90.26 87.52 92.58 89.63
0.05% 88.96 85.89 88.96 85.89 90.61 88.06
0.01% 85.41 83.27 85.41 83.27 87.37 84.95
0.01% 78.97 75.96 78.97 75.96 81.05 78.20
Table 2: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the geometry-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
FAR
GPDS DB - Appearance-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 58.82 53.38 58.82 53.38 60.78 57.04
0.05% 52.94 41.39 52.94 41.39 58.82 49.50
0.01% 50.98 36.60 50.98 36.60 54.90 46.01
0.01% 31.37 23.97 31.37 23.97 43.14 30.76
Table 3: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the appearance-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
FAR
GPDS DB - Silhouette-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 62.52 61.28 62.52 61.28 65.27 62.57
0.05% 60.26 51.02 60.26 51.02 63.57 57.23
0.01% 58.92 40.65 58.92 40.65 61.49 52.13
0.01% 45.25 34.97 45.25 34.97 55.66 43.22
Table 4: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the silhouette-based system
using the GPDS DB at the four operating points tested.
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FAR
UST DB - Geometry-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 93.29 90.59 93.29 90.59 95.68 92.69
0.05% 92.58 88.95 92.58 88.95 94.56 91.52
0.01% 90.15 86.21 90.15 86.21 92.98 89.14
0.01% 80.27 78.51 80.27 78.51 85.24 80.56
Table 5: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the geometry-based system
using the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
FAR
UST DB - Appearance-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 63.58 57.97 63.58 57.97 66.21 61.86
0.05% 57.25 43.46 57.25 43.46 63.25 52.93
0.01% 54.69 40.65 54.69 40.65 59.82 50.10
0.01% 38.25 29.52 38.25 29.52 51.29 37.37
Table 6: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the appearance-based system
using the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
FAR
UST DB - Silhouette-based system
SR1a SR1b SR2a SR2b SR3 Average
0.1% 52.36 50.28 52.36 50.28 53.24 51.70
0.05% 50.53 47.52 50.53 47.52 51.98 49.62
0.01% 48.27 44.59 48.27 44.59 50.37 47.22
0.01% 35.67 33.28 35.67 33.28 45.29 36.64
Table 7: SR of the different attacking scenarios considered against the silhouette-based system
using the UST DB at the four operating points tested.
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based on the same kind of features as the ones used in the development
stage (hand geometry) is used. However, the SR for the other validation
systems, based on completely independent sets of features, remains consid-
erably high:
– In the case of the geometry-based recognition system, the SR reaches
an average SR of over 85% for the three usual operating points consid-
ered and over 90% for the most likely attacking scenario for the UST
DB (i.e., SR2a).
– For the other two validation systems (appearance- and alignment-based),
the SR remains between 50 and 60% on average for the three usual op-
erating points considered.
 Even for an unrealistically high security point (i.e., FAR  0.01%), the
reconstructed images would have, on average,
– Around 80% chances of entering the geometry-based system for both
databases tested.
– Between 30 and 45% chances of breaking the system for the GPDSDB
and over 35% for the UST DB under the appearance- and silhouette-
based systems.
 The results are very similar for the appearance- and silhouette-based sys-
tems. The only significant difference is the decrease of the SR for the latter
when working on the UST DB. The reason behind this worsening is a de-
crease in the performance of the system: silhouette alignment is not as com-
petitive as in the case of the GPDS DB due to projection distortions caused
by the camera acquisition scenario, which leads to a higher EER. Thus, for
identical FAR operating points, the FRR is higher and therefore more hand
images within the intra-user variability are rejected.
 The probabilities of accessing the system in the scenarios 1.a and 2.a, 1.b
and 2.b are the same for each validation system considered. This means that
the validation system is quite robust to several initializations of the Uphill
Simplex algorithm (i.e., reconstructions of the same template). This way,
the scores given by the system do not vary significantly among reconstruc-
tions, which means that either all three or none of them are able to access
the system.
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 As expected, it is more probable that the synthetic samples are positively
matched to the original image from which they were reconstructed than to
other real images of the same user (see the decrease in the SR between SR1a
vs SR1b and between SR2a vs SR2b).
 Even so, the reconstructed images still present a high probability of break-
ing the system even when the stored templates are not the one from which
they were recovered (average SR of SR1b and SR2b around 45% for the
appearance- and silhouette-based systems).
 Furthermore, for the case of using several real samples of the user for veri-
fication (SR3), the reconstructed samples are still able to access the system
for:
– Around 92% of the attempts in the usual operating points, and for al-
most 80% in the extremely high operating point tested for the geometry-
based validation system.
– Around 60% of the attempts in the usual operating points, and for
almost 50% in the extremely high operating point tested for the re-
maining two validation systems.
The results presented in Tables 2 to 7 confirm the first and second objectives
set in the present work: hand shape images may be recovered from their templates,
and the reconstructed images represent a real threat to the integrity of automatic
recognition systems. Recall that the third goal of the work is to determine the
feasibility of generating multiple synthetic hand images that yield templates very
similar to a real one. In order to address this point, results from experiment 2.a
(i.e., all 3 synthetic images are compared to the original from which they were
reconstructed) are presented in Tables 8 to 10 from a different perspective. In this
case we present in each column the percentage of attacks in which only n out of
the 3 reconstructed images (with n = 1, 2, 3) were positively matched to their
original real image. For all cases the total attacks performed is ATn = 144 for the
GPDS DB and ATn = 564 for the UST DB, and the success rate will be noted as
SRn.
As it can be observed, for all the operating points tested, either all the synthetic
samples (n = 3) or none of them were able to access the system: the columns
n = 1 and n = 2 show a SR of 0% in all cases. This means that for all the users, it
never occurred that only 1 or 2 of the reconstructions were positively matched to
the user model. However, averaging the four attacked operating points, all three
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FAR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 90.26 0 0 93.29
0.01% 0 0 88.96 0 0 92.58
0.05% 0 0 85.41 0 0 90.15
0.01% 0 0 78.97 0 0 80.27
Average 0 0 85.9 0 0 89.1
Table 8: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were
positively matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results
are given for the four operating points tested on the geometry-based recognition system.
FAR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 58.82 0 0 63.58
0.01% 0 0 52.94 0 0 57.25
0.05% 0 0 50.98 0 0 54.69
0.01% 0 0 31.37 0 0 38.25
Average 0 0 48.6 0 0 53.4
Table 9: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were
positively matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results
are given for the four operating points tested on the appearance-based recognition system.
FAR
GPDS DB UST DB
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
0.1% 0 0 62.52 0 0 52.36
0.01% 0 0 60.26 0 0 50.53
0.05% 0 0 58.92 0 0 48.27
0.01% 0 0 45.25 0 0 35.67
Average 0 0 56.7 0 0 46.7
Table 10: Percentage of successful attacks where n out of the total three reconstructions were
positively matched against the original hand image from which they were reconstructed. Results
are given for the four operating points tested on the silhouette-based recognition system.
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reconstructions (n = 3) were positively matched to the original image for around
55% of the cases. These results confirm the third objective of the work: the ability
of the proposed probabilistic reconstruction algorithm to generate multiple hand
shapes that match one specific template.
But, why is this the case? Why do either all or none of the reconstructed im-
ages of one user are able to access the system? A probable explanation to this fact
is that, as previously explained in Sect. 6.1, the initialization parameters for both
the Uphill Simplex (G distribution) and the hand shape generator (average hand
x and PCA matrix P ) remain constant across executions of the global algorithm:
even though the G distribution is randomly sampled, the distribution does not
change; and the same data is used to compute x and P . Therefore, the proposed
method is able to reconstruct a hand sample as long as it lies within the variabil-
ity range found in the development database: GPDS2 DB. This way, the recon-
structed hand shapes deceive the system for a given user either always (n = 3) or
never (n = 0): in the first case, the user samples fall within the development data
variability range, while in the second case the user discriminative characteristics
are not modelled by the development dataset. Thus, in order to achieve a higher
overall SR, the development database should be as big and statistically significant
as possible.
It should also be noted that the experiments have also proven that the recon-
struction method is robust to:
 Databases acquired under totally different conditions: in the GPDS DB a
scanner where the hands were placed flat on the surface (thus leading to a
certain degree of distortion in the images) was used, while the images of the
UST DB were acquired with a CCD camera (no contact plastic distortion).
 Systems based on different sets of features: even though a geometry-based
system was used in the development step, while in the validation stage ex-
periments were carried out on systems based on geometric, general appearance-
and silhouette-related features, the SR of the attacks was over 50% for the
three realistic operating points tested.
Finally, in Fig. 7 some samples of both real and reconstructed hand images
coming from the GPDS DB, S-GPDS DB, UST DB and S-UST DB are depicted.
As can be observed, the reconstructed hand shapes capture all the details of the
original user hands, such as the thick and short fingers of the fourth hand in the
UST DB or the different curvatures of the outer part of the hand. Furthermore,
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Figure 7: Typical hand images that can be found in the real database (first column) with the three
corresponding reconstructions (second to fourth columns) for the GPDS DB (left) and the UST
DB (right).
GPDS DB S-GPDS DB UST DB S-UST DB
100% 75.30% 100% 68.60%
Table 11: Percentage of valid samples for the real (GPDS and UST DB) and synthetic (S-GPDS
and S-UST DB) databases.
we can also see that the three reconstructions of the same image vary among
themselves as could be expected from different real samples of the same user
(i.e., intra-user variability): the position of the fingers is not the same in the three
images and even the shape of the fingers is slightly different.
6.3. Quality Assessment
Even though quality assessment is a key research topic in biometric recogni-
tion [24, 3], not many quality-related studies have been carried out on geometry
hand recognition and, to the best of our knowledge, all of them classify samples
as either valid or non valid (no quality measure is given) [10]. Furthermore, low-
quality samples are usually quantified by means of the Failure To Enrol (FTE, for
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Figure 8: Valid (on the left) and non-valid (on the right) images that may be found in the validation
databases used in the experiments. Right hands belong to the UST DB while left hands belong to
the GPDS DB.
training) and Failure To Acquire (FTA, for recognition) rates [42].
Although experimental results presented in Sects. 6.1 and 6.2 have proven the
ability of the proposed reconstruction approach to generate realistic synthetic sam-
ples that are positively matched to the original one by a set of different recognition
algorithms, in this section the appearance of the reconstructed samples is further
analysed from a quality-based perspective.
The main objective of the experimental setup is to determine whether the syn-
thetic images present a similar quality level (in terms of anatomical appearance)
to that of the real samples, according to some automatic assessment tool. For this
purpose, the algorithm proposed in [10] is used. Several steps are followed before
reaching a valid/non-valid decision:
 Segment the hand from the background.
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 Extract hand contour and measure finger widths.
 Compute ratios between finger lengths in order to assess whether the mea-
surements are anatomically correct. If each of the quality ratios computed
lies within a previously estimated (according to pre-annotated good quality
images) valid range, the hand is accepted as valid; otherwise, it is discarded
as non-valid. Further details about the different steps performed by this
automatic quality assessment application are given in [10].
With this approach, low-quality images presenting damp on the scanner sur-
face or other kinds of artefacts, are automatically detected and discarded: hand
contours are not correctly extracted and therefore measurements are inaccurate.
Similarly, if a synthetic hand image presents deformities such as irregular fingers
or extremely deep valleys, this quality module will detect them.
In Table 11, the percentage of valid images of each of the databases used in
the experiments is shown. The real databases do not present invalid images, as it
was expected: the acquisition scenarios were controlled and lead to high-quality
samples. For the synthetic databases generated in the previous experiments, the
percentage of valid samples is also high: around 70%. Therefore, these quality-
related results confirm those obtained in Sects. 6.1 and 6.2 about the efficiency of
the proposed reconstruction method to generate realistic and anatomically feasible
hand shape samples.
Some examples of valid and non-valid reconstructed images together with the
genuine samples from which they were generated are shown in Fig. 8. We can
observe how non-valid synthetic images show fingers with bizarre contours (first
sample), curved fingers (second sample) or protuberances on the hand shape (third
sample). On the contrary, valid samples present the characteristics of actual hand
images, as expected.
7. Conclusions
The experiments carried out in the present work show that the information
stored on hand shape templates is enough to retrieve the original hand image,
regardless of the data format and the features used for recognition. This poses
serious security and privacy issues that should be taken into account by the bio-
metric community in order to prevent that user templates are compromised or, in
case they are, to detect fraudulent access attempts using reconstructed samples.
This way, we may consider two different approaches to prevent this vulnerability,
namely:
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 Prevention, that is, try to avoid the users’ templates being compromised.
We could, for example, securely store biometric data or protect the commu-
nication channels through encryption [66].
 Protection, that is, try to minimize the probabilities of the attack of break-
ing into the system should a template be compromised. This would be the
case of biometric-based countermeasures to detect synthetic from real hand
images such as the liveness-detection techniques [60, 78].
It may be argued that, for attacks such as the one considered in this work
to be successful, the original templates must firstly fall in the wrong hands. In
classic biometric systems where the enrolled templates are kept in a centralized
database this may be difficult, yet possible: the attacker would have to extract the
information from the database or intercept the communication channel when the
stored template is released for matching.
However, Match-on-Card (MoC) applications are rapidly growing due to sev-
eral appealing characteristics such as their privacy (you carry the only copy of
your biometric data) and scalability [6]. In these systems the matching is per-
formed inside a smartcard where the enrolled template of the user is also stored.
This smartcard could be easily lost or stolen. Furthermore, biometric data is be-
ing stored in many official documents such as the new biometric passport [33],
some national ID cards [29], or the US FIPS-201 Personal Identity Verification
initiatives (PIV) [54] and the ILO Seafarers Identity Card Program [34]. With this
kind of systems, templates are more likely to be compromised as it is easier for
the attacker to have physical access to the storage device and fraudulently obtain
the information contained inside as has already been proven [5]. This makes MoC
systems potentially more vulnerable to the type of threat described in this article.
In either case, centralized or MoC systems, the present work has proven that
attacks using reconstructed hand images constitute a real threat, stressing out the
importance of equipping automatic recognition systems with all the necessary
countermeasures against it.
Research works such as the one presented in this article pretend to increase
the existing knowledge on the hand trait and to shed some light into the difficult
problem of biometric security evaluation. Performing systematic studies of bio-
metric systems vulnerabilities is essential before effective countermeasures that
minimize the effects of the detected threats can be developed, in order to increase
the confidence of the final users in this thriving technology.
Other possible applications of the proposed reconstruction method that may
be studied as part of future work include:
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 The use of different reconstructed samples of one same user to enlarge ex-
isting databases for research purposes such as improving the performance
of recognition systems: the more training samples we have, the better the
system learns the intraclass variability of each user.
 The possibility of using this approach to reconstruct different biometric
traits. The reconstruction algorithm could be generalized to reconstruct po-
tentially any trait by using the Uphill Simplex algorithm to optimize the
input of the appropriate generator (e.g., iris, fingerprint or face generator).
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